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Resumo
Este trabalho investiga a existência de possíveis assimetrias nos objetivos do Banco Central. Assumindo 
que a função perda é assimétrica em relação a desvios positivos e negativos do gap do produto e da taxa 
de inflação em relação à meta, nós estimamos uma função de reação não linear que permite identificar e 
testar a significância estatística dos parâmetros de assimetrias nas preferências da autoridade monetária. 
Para o período de 2000-2007, os resultados indicaram que o Banco Central brasileiro apresentou uma 
preferência assimétrica a favor de uma inflação acima da meta. Visto que este comportamento pode ser 
decorrente das decisões de política em momentos de fortes crises (tais como as de 2001 e 2002), nós 
delimitamos a nossa amostra para o período de 2004-2007. Para este período, nós não encontramos 
evidências empíricas apontando para qualquer tipo de assimetria nas preferências sobre a estabilização 
da inflação e do gap do produto.
Palavras-Chave 
política monetária, preferências assimétricas, regras de taxa de juros não lineares, Brasil
Abstract
This paper investigates the existence of possible asymmetries in the Central Bank of Brazil’s objectives. By 
assuming that the loss function is asymmetric with regard to positive and negative deviations of the out-
put gap and of the inflation rate from its target, we estimated a nonlinear reaction function which allows 
identifying and checking the statistical significance of asymmetric parameters in the monetary authority’s 
preferences. For years 2000 to 2007, results indicate that the Central Bank of Brazil showed asymmetric 
preference over an above-target inflation rate. Given that this behavior may stem from policy decisions 
in periods of severe crises (e.g., in 2001 and in 2002), we restricted our sample to the 2004-2007 period. 
We did not find any empirical evidence of any type of asymmetry in the preferences over the stabilization 
of inflation and of the output gap for this period.
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1  Introduction
Ever since the early 1990s the economic literature dealing with the analysis of 
monetary policy actions by way of reaction function estimates has been gaining mo-
mentum. Taylor (1993) rule is probably the most widely known specification of this 
reaction function in this literature. According to this rule, the monetary authority 
responds to deviations of output and of inflation from their targets through nomi-
nal interest rate fluctuations regarded as policy instrument. Another specification 
that has received considerable attention is the forward-looking reaction function 
proposed by Clarida et al. (1997, 2000). In this type of policy rule, the policymaker 
adjusts the current interest rate by considering the future values expected for infla-
tion and for the output gap. A common feature of these two types of interest rate 
rules is that they are linear functions relative to variables that describe economic 
conditions. This can be explained by the fact that both specifications are theoreti-
cally based upon the linear-quadratic model, where the monetary authority’s loss 
function is assumed to be quadratic and the equations describing the economic 
framework are linear.
Nevertheless, two theoretical approaches were developed recently which have 
challenged the linear-quadratic framework behind the linear reaction function. 
The first approach rejects the assumption that the economic framework is linear. 
Orphanides and Wieland (1999) derive optimal policy rules for the case in which 
the monetary authority presents a quadratic loss function and is faced up with a 
zone-linear Phillips curve that allows for nonlinearities in the short-term trade-off 
between inflation and output. Nobay and Peel (2000) assessed optimal discretio-
nary monetary policy under a nonlinear Phillips curve and found that the monetary 
authority can no longer remove the inflation bias by establishing a target for the ou-
tput that equals the natural rate. Dolado et al. (2005) demonstrate that the central 
bank’s optimal reaction function for an economy with a nonlinear Phillips curve is 
a forward-looking interest rate rule that has been increased in order to include the 
interaction between expected inflation and the output gap. 
The second theoretical approach considers that policymakers may have asymme-
tric preferences with regard to their objectives. According to Cukierman (2000), 
politicians and the general public are often more averse to negative output gaps 
than to positive ones in relation to the potential output. The Federal Reserve’s 
vice-chairman, Alan Blinder, asserted that “in most situations the CB will take far 
more political heat when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inflation than 
when it eases preemptively to avoid higher unemployment” Blinder (1998, p. 19-
20). Given that in democratic governments independent central banks are not to-
tally insensitive to political organizations, this type of asymmetry may be seen in 
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the policymaker’s loss function. In addition, in periods during which the monetary 
authority is more concerned with lending credibility to its disinflationary policy, 
the loss due to positive deviations of the inflation rate from its target is likely larger 
than that one resulting from negative deviations of the same magnitude.
The consequences of including asymmetric preferences in the monetary authority’s 
loss function have been investigated by several authors. Cukierman (2000) de-
monstrates that when the policymaker is uncertain about the economic conditions 
and when he is more sensitive to negative output gaps, an inflation bias arises even 
when the target for the actual output is the potential output of the economy. 
This result has been supported by empirical evidence gathered by Cukierman and 
Gerlach (2003) for a group of 22 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) countries. Gerlach (2000) and Surico (2007) found out that 
the Federal Reserve was more worried about negative output gaps than about posi-
tive ones in the pre-1980 period. Bec et al. (2002) verified that the business cycle 
phase, measured by the output gap, has played an important role in the conduct of 
monetary policy by the central banks of Germany, USA and France. Cukierman 
and Muscatelli (2003, 2008) provide evidence of nonlinearities regarding inflation 
and output gap in reaction functions estimated for Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the USA. Dolado et al. (2004) observed that Federal Reserve’s preferences 
regarding inflation were asymmetric during the Volcker-Greespan era.
Following this line of research, the present paper seeks to estimate a nonlinear re-
action function for the Central Bank of Brazil that allows testing the existence of 
asymmetries in their objectives regarding inflation and output during the inflation 
targeting regime. Taking the model proposed by Surico (2007) as our theoretical 
framework, we obtain an optimal monetary policy rule for the monetary authority 
considering that its loss function is potentially asymmetric. Given that the presence 
of asymmetries in objectives produces nonlinear responses of the interest rate to 
inflation and to the output gap, we checked whether the policymaker’s preferences 
are symmetric by testing the null hypothesis of linearity of the reaction function. 
Also, we estimated the asymmetric parameters in the Central Bank’s preferences 
and tested whether these coefficients are statistically significant.
The Brazilian literature presents several studies on the Central Bank’s reaction 
function. Silva and Portugal (2001) estimated a Taylor rule for the periods that 
preceded and followed the inflation targeting regime and concluded that the ex-
perience acquired from the inflation targeting regime can be regarded as a case of 
credibility construction instead of an enhancement of Central Bank’s conserva-
tism. Salgado et al. (2005) modeled the Central Bank’s reaction function using a 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and found different dynamics for the Selic 
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interest rate during and outside the periods of exchange rate crises. Minella et al. 
(2003), Holland (2005), Policano and Bueno (2006), Soares and Barbosa (2006) 
and Teles and Brundo (2006) showed that in the inflation targeting regime the 
Selic interest rate strongly reacted to expected inflation. Bueno (2005) and Lima 
et al. (2007) estimated a Markov-switching reaction function and found evidence 
of diferent monetary policy regimes after the Real Plan Real. Neto and Portugal 
(2007) estimated the reaction functions for the chairmanships of Armínio Fraga 
and Henrique Meirelles and found evidence supporting the conduct of monetary 
policy in the inflation targeting regime. Even though some of these studies consider 
nonlinearities in the reaction function, none of them seeks to confirm whether the 
Central Bank’s preferences regarding inflation and output have been asymmetric. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model and 
derives the optimal reaction function for the interest rate as a first-order condition 
for the Central Bank’s optimization problem. Section 3 presents the reduced form 
for the interest rate rule to be estimated in order to check the existence of asym-
metries in the monetary authority’s objectives. Section 4 shows and analyzes the 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2  The Theoretical Model
The present paper is theoretically based upon the model proposed by Surico (2007). 
The model uses the new-Keynesian structure assessed by Clarida et al. (1999) and 
allows the monetary authority to have asymmetric preferences with regard to its 
objectives or targets. Specifically, the monetary authority is allowed to be more 
averse to negative deviations of the actual output from the potential output and to 
positive deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target. The presence of 
these types of asymmetries constitutes the explanation for possible nonlinear res-
ponses of the monetary policy interest rate to inflation and output fluctuations. 
2.1 structure of the Economy
Following Clarida et al. (1999), we considered an economy whose evolutionary 
behavior can be described by the following equations:
 1 1( )t t t t t t tx i E E x e+ += −ϕ − π + +  (1)
 1t t t t tkx E u+π = + θ π +  (2)
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where xt is the output gap (the difference between actual output and potential 
output), πt is the inflation rate, Etxt+1 and Et πt+1 are the expected values for the 
output gap and for inflation conditional on the information available at t, it is the 
nominal interest rate, et is a demand shock, ut is a cost shock and ϕ, k and θ are 
positive constants.1 
The IS curve, represented by equation (1), is a log-linearized version of consumption 
Euler equation which is derived from the optimal family decision about consump-
tion/saving, after the imposition of the market clearing condition. The expected 
future output gap shown in this equation indicates that, since families prefer to cut 
down consumption over time, the expectation for a higher level of consumption in 
the future leads to higher consumption in the present, thus increasing the current 
demand for output.
Phillips curve (2) captures the characteristic of staggered nominal prices in which 
each firm has a probability θ of keeping the price of its product fixed in any time 
period (CALVO, 1983). Given that probability θ is supposedly constant and inde-
pendent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment, the average time at which 
the price is kept fixed is given by 1/1-θ. This discrete nature of price adjustment 
encourages each firm to set a higher price the higher the expected future inflation. 
The positive effect of the output gap on inflation reflects the increase in marginal 
costs produced by excess demand. 
Finally, shocks et and ut comply with the following autoregressive processes:
 1t e t te e ê−= ρ +  (3)
where 0 ≤ ρe, ρu ≤ 1 and, êt and ût are i.i.d random variables with zero mean and 
standard deviations σe and σu, respectively. 
 1t u t tu u û−= ρ +  (4)
where 0 ≤ ρe, ρu ≤ 1 and, êt and ût are i.i.d random variables with zero mean and 
standard deviations σe and σu, respectively. 
1 The aggregate behavioral equations (1) and (2) are explicitly derived from the optimizing beha-
vior of firms and families in an economy with currency and nominal price rigidity (CLARIDA 
et al., 1999).
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2.2  Monetary authority’s asymmetric objectives
Suppose that monetary policy decisions are made before shocks et and ut. Therefore, 
conditional on the information available at the end of the previous period, the mo-
netary authority tries to choose current interest rate it and a sequence of future 
interest rates so as to minimize:
 
1
0
t tE L
∞
τ
− +τ
τ=
δ∑  (5)
subject to equations (1) and (2), where δ is the fixed discount factor. The monetary 
authority’s loss function at time t, Lt, is given by:
 
( *) *
* 2
2 2
e 1 e ( ) 1 ( )
2
t tx
t t
t t
xL i i
γ α π −π− γ − − α π − π − µ= λ + + −
γ α
 (6)
where π* is the inflation target, λ is the relative weight on the deviation of the ou-
tput gap from the potential output and µ is the relative weight on the stabilization 
of the interest rate. The monetary authority is assumed to stabilize inflation around 
the constant inflation target, π*, to maintain the output gap closed at zero and to 
stabilize the nominal interest rate around its target, i*.
The linex specification in (6) was introduced by Varian (1974) and included in the 
analysis of optimal monetary policy by Nobay and Peel (1998). The advantage of 
this function is that it allows the policymaker to deal differently with positive and 
negative output deviations from the potential output and deviations of the inflation 
rate from the inflation target. As shown in Figure 1, a negative value of γ indicates 
that the marginal loss associated with a negative output gap is larger than that of 
a positive output gap with the same absolute value. This occurs because whenever 
the output gap is positive, the exponential component in loss function (6) domina-
tes the linear component, whereas the opposite is observed whenever the output 
gap is negative. In this case, the monetary authority is said to have a precautionary 
demand for economic expansion (CUKIERMAN, 2000).
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 (a) (b)
Figure 1 –  Symmetric and Asymmetric Loss Function Relative to Output Gap (a) and 
Inflation (b)
A positive value of α reveals that the monetary authority has a precautionary de-
mand for price stability, i.e., the marginal loss of a positive deviation of the inflation 
rate from its target is larger than that of a negative deviation of the same magnitude 
(see Figure 1). Although this behavior is plausible, one should underscore that linex 
specification (6) does not prevent α from being negative, indicating that a below-
target inflation rate is costlier than an above-target one. For the special case in whi-
ch both γ and α tend towards zero, (6) is reduced to the symmetric loss function
2 * 2 * 21 ( ) ( )
2t t t t
L x i i = λ + π − π + µ −  .
Optimization problem (5) is solved under discretion. This implies that the po-
licymaker regards the expectations of future variables as given and chooses the 
current interest rate, reoptimizing it in each period. Since there is no endogenous 
persistence in inflation and in output gap, the intertemporal optimization problem 
can be reduced to a static optimization problem sequence. Therefore, by taking the 
first-order condition and solving it for it, we obtain:
 
( *)
*
1 1 2 1
1 1t tx
t t t
e ei i c E c E
γ α π −π
− −
   − −= + +   γ α   
 (7)
where
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1 2;
kc cλϕ ϕ= =
µ µ
 (8)
According to (7), the optimal nominal interest rate at time t reacts nonlinearly to 
inflation and to the output gap expected for time t. As c1 and c2 are both positive, 
the monetary authority increases the nominal interest rate in response to hikes both 
in the expected output gap and in the expected inflation rate. 
When both γ and α tend towards zero, by using the L’Hôpital’s rule, it is possible 
to show that equation (7) is reduced to the following reaction function:
 
* *
1 1 2 1( )t t t t ti i c E x c E− −= + + π − π  (9)
In this case, the monetary policy interest rate responds linearly to the expected 
output gap and to the inflation rate expected for period t.2 From the comparison 
between equations (9) and (7), we can observe that the presence of asymmetries in 
the objectives of the monetary authority directly implies a nonlinear interest rate 
reaction function. Thus, a way to check the hypothesis of symmetric preferences is 
to test the functional form of the monetary authority’s reaction function. 
3  Reduced-Form Reaction Function 
In this section, we derive the reduced form for the interest rate rule to be estima-
ted so as to check the existence of asymmetries in the Central Bank’s loss function 
during the inflation targeting regime. As pointed out by Surico (2007), the estima-
tion procedures of the model and of the test of the null hypothesis of symmetric 
preferences (H0:γ=α=0) are complex due to the indeterminacy of important para-
meters and due to the presence of unidentified nuisance parameters under the null 
hypothesis. For instance, if γ=α=0, then the coefficients related to the inflation 
rate and to the output gap in reaction function (7) are indeterminate. In addition, 
when α=0, the inflation target is an unidentified nuisance parameter, implying 
that the conventional statistical theory is not available for obtaining the asymptotic 
distribution of statistical tests under the null hypothesis (LUUKKONEN et al., 
1988; VAN DIjK et al., 2002). 
2 This type of implicit interest rate rule was analyzed by Rudebusch (2002) and Clarida et al. 
(2000). 
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To circumvent these problems, we followed the suggestion given by Luukkonen 
et al. (1988) and linearized the exponential terms in (7) by way of a first-order 
Taylor expansion around γ=0 and α=0. The result of this procedure is the following 
reduced-form reaction function:
* * * 2 2
1 1 1 1( ) ( )2 2
t
t t t t t t t t t
k ki i E E x E E x− − − −
zϕ λϕ α ϕ γλϕ= + π − π + + π − π + +
µ µ µ µ µ
  (10)
where zt is the remainder ofthe Taylor series approximation. 
In order to get to the final specification of the reaction function to be estimated in 
this paper, we considered two changes to equation (10). First, we introduced two 
interest rate lags to capture the tendency of the monetary authority towards smoo-
thing the changes in the monetary policy instrument and towards avoiding serial 
autocorrelation problems.3 Among the possible explanations to this smoothing, we 
highlight the following: i) uncertainties over the data and over the coefficients in 
the monetary transmission mechanism; ii) the policymakers’ actions are taken only 
when they are confident about the results to be produced by these actions; iii) large 
changes in interest rates can destabilize the financial and exchange rate markets; iv) 
reversions in monetary policy actions may be seen as errors or evidence of policy 
inconsistency; v) small but persistent changes in the short-term interest rate cause 
a remarkable effect of the monetary policy on aggregate demand without requiring 
excess volatility of this interest rate.4,5
The second change consists in replacing the expected inflation and output gap va-
lues in (10) with their realized values. This way, we obtain the following interest 
rate reaction function:
* * 2 2
1 2 0 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 2(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]t t t t t t t ti d d d x d d x i i− −= −ρ −ρ + π − π + + π − π + + ρ + ρ + υ   (11)
3 For Brazil, interest rate smoothing by the Central Bank was observed by Silva and Portugal 
(2001), Minella et al. (2003), Salgado et al. (2005), Bueno (2005) and Neto and Portugal 
(2007).
4 For a theoretical and empirical study of monetary policy interest rate smoothing, see Clarida et 
al. (1997), Sack (1998), Woodford (1999, 2003), Sack and Wieland (2000), Srour (2001).
5 Woodford (1999, 2003) demonstrated that the interest rate rule for a Central Bank which can 
commit itself optimally presents some inertia regardless of endogenous persistence in inflation, 
or in the output gap or in the exogenous natural interest rate process. As pointed out by this 
author, “it is the desirability of the central bank’s being able to credibly commit itself in this way 
that makes it desirable for monetary policy to be somewhat inertial” (WOODFORD, 2003, p. 
10). For a discretionary Central Bank, as is the case in our study, Woodford (1999, 2003) shows 
that an inertial policy rule draws the reactions ofinterest rate equilibrium to economic shocks 
closer to those that would be observed in an optimal plan (when the Central Bank can commit 
itself optimally).
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where the coefficients di, i=0,...,4, are given by 
 
*
0 1 2 3 4; ; ; ;2 2
k kd i d d d dϕ λϕ α ϕ γλϕ= = = = =
µ µ µ µ
  (12)
And the error term υt is defined as 
{ }2 2 2 21 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] tt t t t t t t t t t t t td E d x E x d E d x E x− − − − zυ = − −ρ −ρ π − π + − + π − π + − + µ   (13)
From expression (13), we may observe that the term in curly brackets is a linear 
combination of forecast errors and, for that reason, υt is orthogonal to any variable 
of the model available in the information set at t-1. 
Two important characteristics of reaction function (11) should be underscored. The 
first concerns the fact that the hypothesis of symmetry in the monetary authority’s 
objectives can be tested by estimating coefficients di’s. From (11) and (12), one 
can see that the imposition of restriction γ=α=0 corresponds to d3 =d4=0. Thus, 
testing the null hypothesis of symmetric preferences, H0:γ=α=0, is the same as 
testing the null hypothesis of linearity, H’0=d3= d4=0.6 The statistical significance 
of the restrictions imposed by H’0 can be verified by the Wald test. Under H’0, the 
Wald test statistic has approximately a χ2 distribution with r degrees of freedom, 
where r is the number of restrictions imposed. The second characteristic is that 
the reduced form of the monetary policy rule allows obtaining estimates for the 
asymmetric parameters in the loss function, since α=2d3/d1 and γ=2d4/d2. 
In addition to reaction function (11), we estimated five alternative specifications in 
order to render the empirical model more suitable to the conduct of the Brazilian 
monetary policy in the current inflation targeting regime. First, we considered a 
deviation from the original assumption that the inflation target is constant. This 
modification is necessary since in the 1999-2004 period, the inflation targets, esta-
blished by the National Monetary Council (NMC), changed annually.7 Therefore, 
the specification with a time-varying inflation target is given by: 
* * 2 2
1 2 0 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 2(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]t t t t t t t t t ti d d d x d d x i i− −= −ρ −ρ + π − π + + π − π + + ρ + ρ + υ   (14)
6 The power of the test which is based on reaction function (11) depends on the confirmation 
that d1 and d2 are statistically different from zero because it is possible not to reject the null 
hypothesis of linearity since these coefficients are equal to zero. 
7 Table A1 in the Appendix A shows the inflation targets for the 1999-2008 period. 
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In the second alternative specification, we considered that the Central Bank reacts 
to deviations of the expected inflation from the inflation target. By knowing that 
the inflation targets for year T and T+1 in the Brazilian inflation targeting regime 
are disclosed to the policymaker at the beginning of year T, it is plausible to as-
sume that monetary policy actions are taken based on the deviation of expected 
inflation from the target for the current and subsequent years. Thus, we followed 
the suggestion given by Minella et al. (2003) and we used the variable Dj, which is 
a weighted measure of the deviation of the expected inflation for years T and T+1 
from their respective inflation targets, i.e.: 
 
* *
1 1
(12 ) ( ) ( ).
12 12j T T j T Tt
Dj
j jE E + +
−= π − π + π − π   (15)
where j is the monthly rate, EjπT is the inflation expectation in month j for year T, 
EjπT+1 is the inflation expectation in month j for year T+1, π*T    is the inflation target 
for year T and π*T+1  is the inflation target for year T+1. The nonlinear reaction func-
tion with the variable Dj is denoted by:
 
2 2
1 2 0 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 2(1 )[ ]t t t t t t t ti d d Dj d x d Dj d x i i− −= −ρ −ρ + + + + + ρ + ρ + υ   (16)
Finally, we considered nonlinear reaction functions in which the interest rate reacts 
to the output gap at t-2 and to the deviation of inflation from its target at t-1. This 
assumption is justified by the fact that the monthly data on inflation and economic 
activity are only available to the monetary authority with a lag of 1 and 2 periods, 
respectively. Therefore, we estimated the following specifications: 
* * 2 2
1 2 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 1 1 2 2(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]t t t t t t t ti d d d x d d x i i− − − − − −= −ρ −ρ + π − π + + π − π + + ρ + ρ + υ   (17)
* * 2 2
1 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 4 2 1 1 2 2(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]t t t t t t t t t ti d d d x d d x i i− − − − − − − −= −ρ −ρ + π − π + + π − π + + ρ + ρ + υ   (18)
2 2
1 2 0 1 2 2 3 4 2 1 1 2 2(1 )[ ]t t t t t t t ti d d Dj d x d Dj d x i i− − − −= −ρ −ρ + + + + + ρ + ρ + υ   (19)
4  Results
4.1  Data Description
To estimate the Central Bank’s nonlinear reaction functions described in the pre-
vious section, we used monthly data for the period between january 2000 and 
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October 2007. The series were obtained from the Institute for Applied Economic 
Research (IPEA) and from the Central Bank of Brazil websites.8 The dependent 
variable, it, is the annualized monthly Selic interest rate. This variable has been used 
as the major monetary policy instrument in the inflation targeting regime.
The inflation rate, πt, is the inflation accumulated in the past 12 months, measured 
by the Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA).9 For the specification that includes 
the deviation of inflation from a constant target, we used the mean annual inflation 
targets. 10 Where inflation targets were time-varying, we interpolated the annual 
targets in order to obtain the series with monthly frequency.11
The variable Djt present in specifications (16) and (19) is built from inflation tar-
gets established for years T and T+1, and from the series of inflation expectations 
obtained from the survey conducted by the Central Bank at financial institutions 
and consultancy firms. In this survey, firms are supposed to state the inflation rate 
they expect for years T (EjπT) and T+1 (EjπT+1).
The output gap (xt) is measured by the percentage difference between the seaso-
nally adjusted industrial production index (yt) and the potential output (ypt), i.e., 
xt = 100(yt - ypt)/ypt. Here, there is an important problem due to the fact that the 
potential output is an unobserved variable and, for that reason, should be estimated. 
Thus, we obtained the proxy variable for the potential output in three different 
ways: using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, using a linear trend (LT) and using a 
quadratic trend (QT). The output gap series constructed from different potential 
output estimates are called x1t (HP), x2t (LT) and x3t (QT). Finally, we added the 
dummy variable Di,t (=1 for 2002:10-2003:02 and 0, otherwise) in all specifications 
of the reaction function so as to capture the quick and strong increase in the Selic 
rate that resulted from the rise in inflation and in inflation expectations at the end 
of 2002 and at the beginning of 2003.
Before estimating the reaction function, we ran ADF tests to check the stationarity 
of the model’s variables. We chose the optimal number of lagged difference terms 
to be included in each regression, k, based on the Schwarz information criterion. 
The maximum autoregressive order was equal to 24. For the squares of the three 
8 The graphs for the series used are shown in the Appendix A.
9 The IPCA is calculated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and is the 
price index used by the NMC as benchmark for the inflation targeting regime.
10 In all years, except for 2003, we used the central inflation targets as determined by the NMC. 
In 2003, the target used was the one adjusted by the Central Bank (8.5%).
11 To obtain the inflation target for the past 12 months, we interpolated the annual targets using 
equation π*j = [(12-j)/12]π*a,t-1 +(j/12)π*a,t, where π*j is the inflation target in month j for the past 
12 months, π*a,t-1 is the inflation target for year t-1, π*a,t is the inflation target for year t. The re-
sults remain unchanged if we consider the deviation of the accumulated inflation from the target 
predicted for the subsequent 12 months.
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output gap series, the tests included a constant (c), whereas a linear trend (t) was 
also included for the Selic rate.
Table 1 shows that the ADF tests reject, at a 10% significance level, the null hy-
potheses that the explanatory variables in nonlinear reaction functions are not 
stationary.
Table 1 – Unit Root Test - ADF: 2000:01-2007:10
Variable
ADF
Exogenous regressors
k tα
ti 1  -3.34*** c,t
1tx 0 -3.66* -
2
1tx 0 -5.54* c
2tx 0 -2.37** -
2
2tx 0 -3.75* c
3tx 0 -3.54* -
2
3tx 0 -5.22* c
*( )tπ − π 1 -1.97** -
* 2( )tπ − π 1 -2.74* -
*( )t tπ − π 1 -2.31** -
* 2( )t tπ − π 1 -2.96* -
tDj 0  -1.85 *** -
2
tDj 0  -3.60* -
Note: * Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. 
4.2  Estimated reaction Functions
First, we estimated reaction functions (11), (14) and (16) using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) with the optimal weighting matrix which takes into 
account possible heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the residuals 
(HANSEN, 1982). In practice, we used the method proposed by Newey and West 
(1987) with three lags in order to estimate the variance and covariance matrix. 
The set of instrumental variables includes six lags for the Selic rate, output gap and 
inflation rate, lags (-1) and (-3) for the squared output gap, a constant term and the 
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dummy variable Di,t. These instruments imply 14 overidentifying restrictions. We 
tested the validity of these restrictions by way of Hansen’s (1982) J test.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2. Specifications (A), (B) and (C) refer, 
respectively, to specifications with a constant inflation target, with the variable in-
flation rate and with deviation of the expected inflation from the inflation target. 
On the other hand, specifications HP, LT and QT are related to the use of three 
different output gap series (x1t, x2t e x3t) as explained in section 4.1. 
Right away, we may note that the estimates for parameter d3, which measures 
the response of the Selic rate to the squared deviation of current inflation (or of 
the expected inflation) from the target, had a negative sign and were statistically 
significant in all of the estimated reaction functions. It should be highlighted that 
a negative coefficient over *t tπ − π  indicates that a reduction in the Selic rate in 
response to a decrease in inflation relative to the target of a given size is larger than 
the increase of this interest rate caused by an increase in the deviation of inflation 
with the same magnitude. This behavior is consistent with a Central Bank that has 
an asymmetric preference that favors an above-target inflation rate. 
Due to the nonlinear framework, the responses of the monetary policy instrument 
to deviations of the current inflation and of the expected inflation from the infla-
tion target are given by:12
 
*
1 3* 2 ( )( )
i d d E∂ = + π − π
∂ π − π
 (20)
 
1 32 ( )
i d d E Dj
Dj
∂ = +
∂
 (21)
where E(∙) indicates the sample mean. Using these expressions and the coefficient 
values shown in Table 2, we estimated that the response of the Selic rate to the 
deviation of inflation from its target was on average equal to 1.52 in specifications A 
and B, and 3.86 in specification C. This indicates that nonlinear interest rate rules 
satisfy Taylor’s (1993) principle. In addition, the stronger reaction of the moneta-
ry policy to the expected inflation concurs with the results obtained by Holland 
(2005) and Soares and Barbosa (2006) and underscores the forward-looking nature 
of Central Bank’s decisions.
12 As variables πt-π* or Djt also have secondary effects on the Selic rate due to inertial terms it-1 and 
it-2, we derived the responses of this policy instrument in the long run (it=it-1=it-2), when secon-
dary effects are considered. 
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In general, the reaction of the interest rate at the output gap level, measured by 
parameter d2, was nonsignificant. The coefficient over the squared output gap, d4, 
was not statistically different from zero in any of the estimated models. This means 
that there is no empirical evidence of a nonlinear response of the monetary policy 
instrument to the output gap.
The last two lines in Table 2 show the p-values (prob) for the joint hypothesis of 
symmetric preferences and for the hypothesis of validity of overidentifying restric-
tions. For all estimated specifications, the hypothesis of a linear reaction function 
is strongly rejected. This evidence clearly results from the nonlinear reaction of 
the monetary authority to the deviations of inflation from the target. The results 
of the J test indicate that the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected at a 
significance level of 10%.
Table 3 shows the estimates for the monetary authority’s parameters of asymmetric 
preference. The coefficients were found using expressions α=2d3/d1 and γ=2d4/d2. 
The standard errors were calculated using the delta method. Consistently with 
the results shown in Table 2, we can observe that the coefficients that measure the 
asymmetry in the preferences over the output gap, γ, were not statistically diffe-
rent from zero. Conversely, the values for the asymmetric parameter regarding the 
preference over inflation, α, had a negative sign and were statistically significant in 
all estimated specifications. This indicates that the negative deviations of inflation 
from the target of a given size cause a greater loss for the Brazilian monetary au-
thority than the positive deviations with the same magnitude.13
13 As suggested by an anonymous referee, we estimated reaction functions (11), (14) and (16) in-
cluding three lags of the variables ∆qt=qt-qt-1 and ∆12qt=qt-qt-12, where qt is the nominal exchange 
rate in month t, in the set of instrumental variables. The results of the tests for parameters α 
and γ allow drawing the same conclusions in relation to the asymmetries present in the Central 
Bank’s loss function. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3 – Estimates for Asymmetric Preferences 
Parameters specifications
(A)
HP LT QT
α -0.243
*
(0.02)
-0.284*
(0.04)
-0.254*
(0.03)
γ -2.307
n.s
(7.83)
-0.346n.s
(0.25)
 3.328n.s
(10.3)
(B)
HP LT QT
α -0.235
*
(0.03)
-0.204*
(0.03)
-0.228*
(0.02)
γ -7.036
n.s
(84.9)
 0.327n.s
(0.68)
-6.162n.s
(59.9)
(C)
HP LT QT
α -0.260
*
(0.03)
-0.261*
(0.02)
-0.258*
(0.03)
γ  0.002
n.s
(0.40)
 3.958n.s
(30.5)
-0.132n.s
(0.44)
Note: * Significant at 1%. n.s Nonsignificant. 
In Table 4, we provide the estimates for reaction functions (17)-(19), in which the 
monetary policy instrument depends on the deviation of inflation from the target 
at time t-1 and of the output gap at time t-2. Initially, we estimated the monetary 
policy rules using ordinary least squares. As the ARCH test revealed remarkable 
problems with autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, we estimated the re-
action functions assuming that the conditional variance of error terms follows an 
ARMA(p,q) process, where p is the order of the ARCH terms and q is the order 
of the GARCH terms. The last line in Table 4 shows the orders p and q of the 
GARCH models estimated by maximum likelihood.14 
In general, the results are similar to those shown in Tables 2 and 3. The main diffe-
rence concerns the positive and statistically significant response of the Selic rate to 
the output gap, measured by coefficient d2. This suggests that the measure of the 
economic activity entering the reaction function is the gap of the period known 
by the Central Bank at the time when monetary policy decisions are made. With 
regard to the Brazilian monetary authority’s loss function, Table 4 shows that the 
asymmetric parameter in the preferences over the output gap, γ, is not statistically 
14 The selection of p and q was based on Akaike and Schwarz information criteria.
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different from zero, whereas the coefficient that measures the asymmetry in the 
preferences over the deviations of inflation from the target, α, is negative and sig-
nificant in eight out of nine specifications.
In brief, the set of empirical results shown above provides evidence that the Central 
Bank of Brazil has been more averse a to below-target inflation than to an above-tar-
get one. This behavior is the opposite of the one expected by a monetary authority 
that is more concerned with lending credibility to its disinflationary policy. A pos-
sible explanation to this is that the concavity of the reaction function with regard 
to deviations of the inflation rate from the target may reflect the monetary policy 
decisions made in periods of supply shocks (such as the energy crisis in 2001) and 
of fiscal dominance (last quarter of 2002).15 On any of these occasions, the Central 
Bank might have adopted a more gradualist behavior toward inflation control than 
that which is expected from a policymaker with asymmetric preference over a 
below-target inflation. Also, the Brazilian experience with inflation the below-
central target is recent and relatively short. For instance, when one considered the 
inflation deviation series compared to a variable target, only 30 of 94 observations 
showed values smaller than zero. On the other hand, for inflation deviation series 
with a fixed target, πt-π*, and deviation of the expected inflation from the target, 
Djt, the number of observations with negative values drops to 19.
Based on this, we decided to estimate nonlinear reaction functions for the period 
between january 2004 and October 2007. The advantages of using this period are 
the greater stability of the economic activity, lower predominance of shocks affec-
ting inflation expectations and a larger balance between the number of observations 
in which inflation was above and below target. 
15 Blanchard (2004) provides empirical evidence of fiscal dominance in Brazil in 2002. 
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Table 5 – Estimates of Nonlinear Reaction Functions (17) and (19): 2004:1-2007:10
Parameters
Specifications 
(A) (C)
HP LT QT HP LT QT
0d
 13.47*
(1.34)
 14.80*
(0.96)
 13.40*
(1.13)
 10.08***
(5.11)
 9.950n.s
(6.44)
 10.86*
(3.79)
1d
 1.534*
(0.39)
 1.868*
(0.32)
 1.403*
(0.39)
 5.108**
(2.28)
 8.277*
(2.90)
 4.568*
(2.03)
2d
 0.945n.s
(0.78)
 0.374n.s
(0.33)
 0.753n.s
(0.64)
 1.603n.s
(1.41)
 1.336n.s
(1.05)
 1.097n.s
(0.89)
3d
 0.250n.s
(0.26)
 0.081n.s
(0.19)
 0.211n.s
(0.22)
 2.463n.s
(5.38)
 1.851n.s
(5.56)
 1.632n.s
(3.99)
4d
 0.149n.s
(0.25)
-0.101n.s
(0.14)
 0.154n.s
(0.18)
 0.282n.s
(0.44)
 0.077n.s
(0.30)
 0.264n.s
(0.30)
ρ 1
 1.600*
(0.06)
 1.607*
(0.06)
 1.574*
(0.06)
 1.461*
(0.08)
 1.434*
(0.09)
 1.440*
(0.08)
ρ 2
-0.641*
(0.06)
-0.663*
(0.06)
-0.621*
(0.06)
-0.486*
(0.08)
-0.459*
(0.09)
-0.471*
(0.08)
α  0.326
n.s
(0.38)
 0.087n.s
(0.20)
 0.301n.s
(0.36)
 0.964n.s
(2.34)
 0.447n.s
(1.32)
 0.715n.s
(1.93)
γ  0.316
n.s
(0.65)
-0.538n.s
(0.83)
 0.410n.s
(0.70)
 0.352n.s
(0.62)
 0.115n.s
(0.42)
 0.482n.s
(0.72)
R2 – adjusted  0.997  0.997  0.997  0.997  0.997  0.997
W(2) - prob  0.519  0.579  0.396  0.788  0.948  0.683
LB(4) -prob  0.246  0.297  0.233  0.255  0.143  0.280
ARCH(4)-prob  0.627  0.235  0.674  0.524  0.348  0.512
JB - prob  0.095  0.240  0.091  0.084  0.104  0.123
Notes: * Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. n.s Nonsignificant. LB(4) refers 
to the Ljung-Box statistic for serial autocorrelation of up to the fourth order. ARCH(4) re-
fers to the LM-ARCH statistic for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of up to the 
fourth order. jB refers to the jarque-Bera statistic.
Table 5 shows the estimates for the parameters of reaction functions (17) and 
(19), and for the coefficients of asymmetric preferences of the Central Bank.16, 
17 In general, we observe that only the target estimated for the Selic rate, d0, the 
coefficient of response to the deviation of inflation from the target, d1, and the 
autoregressive coefficients, ρ1 and ρ2, were statistically significant. In addition, we 
did not find evidence that the Brazilian monetary authority has asymmetric prefe-
rence over output above or below the target. Finally, we noted that the coefficient 
16 Initially, we tried to estimate specifications (11), (14) and (16) using GMM in the reduced 
sample. However, we often had convergence problems or estimates for parameters that run 
counter to those predicted theoretically. Possible reasons for this may be the small sample size, 
the misspecification of the nonlinear model or the presence of weak instruments. Given these 
shortcomings, we decided to estimate only the reaction functions that include the deviation of 
inflation from the target at t-1 and of the output gap at t-2. 
17  We omitted the results for specification B because estimations revealed major inaccuracy in the 
estimates of coefficients d1 through d4. 
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that measures the asymmetric preference over the stabilization of inflation, α, had 
a positive but not significant sign. This finding suggests that Central Bank’s asym-
metric preferences over an above-target inflation may be associated with monetary 
policy actions taken in periods in which domestic crises strongly affected inflation 
and inflation expectations.
5  Conclusion
In this paper, we assessed possible asymmetries in the Central Bank’s objectives by 
estimating nonlinear reaction functions for the interest rate. To achieve that, we 
derived an optimal monetary policy rule taking into account an asymmetric loss 
function regarding positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the 
inflation rate from the inflation target. Since the presence of asymmetries produces 
nonlinear responses of the interest rate to the deviations of the expected inflation 
from its target and from the output gap, we checked whether preferences are sym-
metric by testing the null hypothesis of linearity of the reaction function. Also, we 
found the policymaker’s coefficients of asymmetric preferences by estimating the 
reaction function in its reduced form and verified whether they are significantly 
different from zero. 
The empirical results showed that the Central Bank’s monetary policy decisions for 
the 2000-2007 period may be characterized by a nonlinear reaction function rela-
tive to inflation, but linear relative to the output gap. Quite specifically, we found 
evidence that the Brazilian monetary authority has been more averse to negative 
rather than positive deviations of inflation from its target. As this behavior may 
result from policy decisions in periods of strong crises (as in 2001 and 2002), we 
estimated the coefficients of asymmetric preferences for the 2004-2007 period. 
The results for this reduced sample did not indicate the existence of any type of 
asymmetric preference regarding the stabilization of inflation and of the output 
gap. 
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Appendix A
Table A1 – Inflation Target: 1999-2008
Year Official target Tolerance interval Adjusted target
1999 8.0% ±2.0% -
2000 6.0% ±2.0% -
2001 4.0% ±2.0% -
2002 3.5% ±2.0% -
2003 4.0% ±2.5% 8.5%
2004 5.5% ±2.5% 5.5%
2005 4.5% ±2.5% 5.1%
2006 4.5% ±2.0% -
2007 4.5% ±2.0% -
2008 4.5% ±2.0% -
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Figure A1 – Selic Rate
Figure A2 – Output Gap
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Figure A3 – Deviation of Inflation from the (Constant) Target
Figure A4 – Deviation of Inflation from the Time-Varying Target
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Figure A5 – Deviation of the Expected Inflation from the Target
